The Curious Case of Western Foreign Policy

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been renowned for its expertise on foreign climes and cultures so it really is mysterious why British foreign policy seems currently to be focused on destabilising areas where its interests require stability.  Perhaps the more pertinent question is why American foreign policy is all about making the world more uncertain, when its interests seem to depend on a certain world.  That must be the more pertinent question because to a large extent British foreign policy is a shadowing of American policy.

Indeed the foreign policy of “Old Europe” when independent from the United States, can be best represented by the Congress of Vienna, where British statesman, Lord Castlereagh, was instrumental in ensuring an agreement that secured the existing political establishment and prevented a major European war for a century.  This was an anti-revolutionary and anti-nationalist treaty, which worked in its goal of achieving peace. 

Today the United States take the lead in Western foreign policy and have adopted policies in recent years that have destabilised the Middle East (particularly through the invasion of Iraq) and thereby allowed Islamist extremism to gain a foothold in the region and also given Iran the opportunity to fill the new vacuum.   It was apparent to the most naïve of foreign-policy observers that remove the strongman Saddam Hussein (hideous as he was) and a factional and internecine power struggle between religious groups would result. 

Despite the example of that consequent bloody civil-war, the United States have recently abandoned their ally Hosni Mubarak to a revolution.  This has sent two messages to the world – that the West does not object to revolution as a means of seizing political power and secondly, that it will not stand by those who take the political risk of allying themselves to the West.

This is not to defend the two dictators, Saddam Hussein and Hosni Mubarak; rather, it is to point out that being rid of brutal strongmen at all costs, even bloody revolution and civil war, is not always right or justifiable.  In Iraq and Egypt, not only were there all the usual risks of revolution – bloody civil war, persecution of minorities, a far worse dictator arising – but, there was also the looming threat of political Islam just waiting for an opportunity, with all its hostility to our interests.

The latest manifestation of the failure of the West to speak out against revolution was the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine.  No doubt the deposed government was especially corrupt and toadied to Russia, but it was elected for a term and there was a mechanism of a general election, when voters would have had the opportunity to throw out the crooks.  Even when there was a possibility of political compromise, the West seemed to pull the rug from under the negotiations.  On the face of it, supporting the Pro-Western revolutionaries seemed more coherent than Middle Eastern policy, but the unintended outcome – a more dominant Russia in the region – shows again that supporting destabilisation is always the high-risk strategy.

This strange foreign policy emanates from the United States and the only explanation (given Western interests have been harmed so much in the Middle East as a result) is a romantic attachment to the idea of revolution.  It is here argued that through a misunderstanding of its own history, perhaps even the “Hollywoodisation” of its own history, in the eyes of a section of America, the revolutionary’s cause is always just.  Well, one only needs to look at real history to see that real revolutions are bloody and destroy custom and morals.  They mean a nation state suffers a sort of ontological violence, because its genesis as a revolutionary state was through violence.  The French Revolution led to the Terror and then to Bonaparte.  The Russian Revolution led to the Bolsheviks and then the terror of Stalinism. Revolution is rarely the way to achieve stable government. 

Dominant American thought imagines their own creation as a state and concludes that throwing aside of custom, law and convention leads to a sort of secular freedom.  Well, there was not an “American Revolution”, there was only an American War of Independence.  That is why the United States emerged as stable and democratic.  The American, slave-owning establishment broke away from the rule of an island across an ocean, but it took with it a political and legal heritage – representative democracy (as opposed to direct democracy) and the common law.  It continued as a functioning state after a war of independence.  There was no one to terrorise as the remote oppressors were the other side of the ocean.  The American establishment continued with the reins of power, but independent of that remote, previous rule.

Indeed where American politics breaks down, such as in the gridlock between President and Congress, is down to those elements of the constitution based upon abstract, French theory of separation of powers, rather than reliance on inherited precedent.

Where the United States are weak is not through their relative newness as a state, but through the fact that they came into existence at just the time when Europe was smashing its table of values.  It therefore took on board the new enlightenment secularism, writing a constitution that set in stone a valueless or neutral society.  Perhaps it is these origins that explain why the United States continue with an apparently overly-optimistic and simplistic view of other cultures, despite the experience of their own bloody civil war. 

This is not to suggest American people (as opposed to the Washington establishment) are in any way naïve.  Many on the American Right recognise the danger of existing under a secular or neutral constitution.  That is why there are campaigns for the Ten Commandments to be placed in schools, despite the historic exclusion of religion from the public square.  Meanwhile in Europe, with our heritage of values that have shaped our own constitutions, we are far more complacent and arrogant than many Americans about the encroaching of secularism. 

It was an American, T S Eliot who warned of the dangers of a neutral society and made the positive case for a Christian society.  It is American Catholics today who are campaigning for one of the Twentieth Century’s greatest Christian apologists, G K Chesterton, to be canonised. 

It is of course difficult to fully understand the history of another state, but it is easier for us as British to understand the United States because they were once legally connected with this polity and they adapted this nation’s institutions and laws to a new continent.  If it is accepted that the United States have misunderstood their own genesis, this would explain its seemingly irrational belief that revolution will lead to pro-Western democracies, as opposed to extremist states bent on hostility to its and our interests.  One can only hope American schools start to teach their children about the War of Independence instead of the American Revolution and that we will see a different, more historically aware foreign policy from a future generation.   

Ring-fence Defence of the Realm

Of all areas of Government spending, defence is the one area that suffered during the years of Labour mismanagement.  Despite fighting two wars at once, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Government continued on a peacetime budget, stretched our armed forces to breaking point and failed to honour the military covenant.  This disastrous approach led to the defeat in Basra and the British public’s dramatic change in its view of foreign intervention – whereas once most of the public saw Britain as a force for good when it intervened militarily abroad, after Blair’s foreign adventures, the public no longer seems to believe that we will intervene for the right reasons or make things better when we do intervene.

Whether this failure by the Exchequer to fund our forces in the frontline had anything to do with the Chancellor’s hostility to a prime minister so keen on exercising the Royal Prerogative to send our troops abroad and as a means of spiting his political rival cannot be proved.  In all other areas of public expenditure Gordon Brown was profligate in his spending of taxpayers’ money and government debt.

With the election of the Coalition Government we have seen drastic defence cuts as part of an overall policy of reducing the large deficit incurred by Labour.  Sadly, as defence saw serious under-funding during the Labour years this means that in effect the defence budget is being hit harder than other budgets, particularly the NHS, which saw lavish spending under Labour.

Of course with our aging population there is a strong case that the NHS should be exempt from spending cuts.  On the other hand, with recent scandals in the NHS it is also clear that spending large amounts of money on the health service does not necessarily ensure a better service for the patient.  Of course, it does expand the number of people working in the public sector, who thereby need government expenditure to remain high to keep them in work.

There is something slightly difficult in trying to justify why departments that did very well out of Labour should receive special treatment when defence is in real terms being hardest hit.  While defence expenditure is not a means of creating or protecting employment, it is very troubling to see those who have risked their lives for us being made redundant.  With regard to the impact of cuts on dockyards such as Portsmouth, while it cannot be argued that money should simply be spent to keep the workforce in work, it can be argued that it is not in the national interest to lose skills that may be necessary in the future.

Meanwhile, the undoubtedly politically-courageous policy of ring-fencing international aid has been zealously adhered to.  It is a courageous policy because it would clearly be very unpopular in a recession to spend taxpayers’ money on poverty abroad rather than at home.

Of course the British public are rightly generous when emergencies such as the recent disaster in the Philippines occur.  Indeed it is right that in such an exigent situation Government money is spent as a means of relieving the suffering of our fellow humans.  That is not the sort of international aid that the British public distrust.  They rather distrust regular payments of their tax money to countries with expanding economies and corrupt governments.  One would have to move in very rarefied circles indeed to believe that such a policy would be popular.

Ring-fencing international aid was therefore no election gimmick.  It is rather a clear foreign policy, which aims to influence by so-called soft power and to head off problems such as anti-Western terrorism by paying money to countries that dislike us.

The British public has less reservation about defence expenditure and the reason is perhaps that
defence of the realm is the first duty of the State.  It is a public good, which cannot be provided by private companies for profit.  It works as a result of an altruistic concept of patriotism. 

It is unlike other public services in that it is not about delivering a service to each of us as individuals, but all of us as a nation.  It cannot therefore benefit from an internal market, whereas other public services can often learn from some aspects of the market.

Defence expenditure is paying for an insurance policy against unforeseen threats.  While the Government no doubt identified important new threats through its strategic defence review, when threats become manifest they have often been unforeseen.  Would we have necessarily forecast the invasion of the Falklands as a threat, when we were more worried about a nuclear Soviet Union?  Would we have foreseen the threat of Islamism?  Judging by the State’s tolerance of Islamic extremists who fomented discontent, hatred and sedition in the 1990s, probably not.

So while it is regrettable to see such a drastic reduction in our professional armed forces (with the Army shrinking by 20,000 men) and a planned reliance on the amateur (in the best sense of the word) element of the TA, it is also worrying.  With Ship-building ceasing at Portsmouth, no aircraft carriers until 2030 and the cutting back of regiments such as the Royal Fusiliers, Britain seems to have embarked on a change in its historic role that has even worried the United States.  This could be as serious a turning point as our withdrawal from the East of the Suez Canal.

The Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, is an honourable politician.  For example, unlike many politicians, he took a principled stand on the issue of same-sex marriage.  One of his greatest skills is his business acumen.  It is important that he remembers though, that the Armed Forces do not operate like a business, but according to older values.  Cost-cutting is necessary across departments, but defence is the department that should be cut least.  Changing Britain’s world role must be about our national interest and values, not just the bottom line.  

     

Special Relationship on the Rocks?

Despite the number of MPs who were critical and despite public opinion no one actually expected that Britain would let down the United States over Syria.  Since loss of Empire it has been the assumption of British politics that a world role can only be achieved through supporting as closely as possible the United States in international affairs.

Apart from fighting together against different manifestations of German militarism in two world wars, the key examples of the Special Relationship are the sharing of intelligence and the basing of nuclear missiles in this country.  The importance of intelligence sharing and the trust between the two nations on intelligence should not be under-estimated.  The agreement between John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan that Britain would have American Polaris missiles, which would be part of a multilateral deterrent albeit fitted with British warheads was a fundamental building block of the post-war relationship.  

The so-called Nassau Agreement followed the nadir in the Anglo-American relationship - the Suez Crisis.  Due to the United States undermining an Anglo-French and Israeli strike against Colonel Nasser’s Egyptian regime, Britain not only lost a Prime Minister, but was seen to have lost its ability to be a global player without the United States.

In the context of Suez or indeed Britain’s refusal to join America’s action in Vietnam, perhaps this recent refusal to back any U.S.  air-strikes in Syria looks less serious.  However, it could be indicative of a recent gradual change in Britain’s world role and its relationship with the United States.

First it must be accepted that the Special Relationship is important to Great Britain.  Our reliability to the United States means we gain influence as the most trusted partner.  While our interests are not identical they often coincide.  We hold similar values of democracy, the rule of law and freedom.  Both nations are on the whole a force for good in the world.  Whereas France has defined its continuing global role in terms of independence from U.S. foreign policy, the United Kingdom has relied on closeness to the United States.  To abandon such an approach would mean starting again from scratch.

The Special Relationship is special to both partners.  The United States relies on British intelligence and vice versa.  A common language, linked history (particularly the shared history of two world wars and the Cold War) and similar legal system all lead to a similar world-view.  For many individual Americans there is a strong emotional affinity with the Old Country.  The strong personal chemistry between our leaders:  Churchill and Roosevelt, Kennedy and Macmillan, Mrs Thatcher and Reagan, Blair and Bush have also ensured a close alliance.

On the other hand, as demonstrated by the American approach to Suez, the cancellation of Skybolt and indeed the invasion of Grenada during the high-point of the Special Relationship when Reagan and Mrs Thatcher were out the helm, America will look after its own interests first.  That should not surprise us.  It is the duty of a state’s government to pursue the national interest.  Likewise the British should always look first and foremost to their national interest.

The current strain in the Special Relationship goes back to when Blair stretched it to breaking point in his involvement in the Iraq War.  Not only did Blair gamble on the future of our Armed Forces, by fighting a war on a peacetime budget (leading to the defeat in Basra),  but he gambled on the future acceptance by the British public of the Special Relationship.  Because Blair unquestioningly almost slavishly supported bad American policy, he actually undermined the future of close cooperation. 

Now there is a most unpropitious situation.  The Oval Office is occupied by a President with little interest in Europe – a man who sent back the bust of Sir Winston Churchill.  Indeed it is sometimes doubtful Obama believes in America let alone its relationship with old allies.  Meanwhile the British Government has drastically cut the nation’s military capacity, leading to concerns from the United States as to whether its closest ally would in future be able to support it..  Notwithstanding this, Great Britain, but for the Iraqi experience, would probably have supported the strike on Syria. 

It would be fair to say Britain has sacrificed a lot for the Special Relationship.  Would France have stood idly by if the sort of oppression carried out by Mugabe in Zimbabwe had taken place in one of its former colonies?  Instead, when Mugabe was committing his worst abuses, Britain spent blood and treasure on the ill-fated Iraqi adventure.

Notwithstanding this, the Special Relationship has probably been better for both nations than worse.  The Special Relationship saw off Nazism and Communism.  Despite the current lack of confidence in the Anglo-Saxon economic model, the world is moving towards free markets.  Anglo-Saxon values have defeated various manifestations of totalitarianism and have shown the core values that underpin our societies are robust.

Britain rightly can grumble about Suez, the delay of the U.S. entry into the world wars, the ambiguity of the U.S. response to the Falklands crisis and Grenada (who can imagine Blair having the strength of conviction to confront Reagan in the way Margaret Thatcher did?).  This is outweighed though by the fact that thanks to American might, we are not dominated by a Socialist Russia or a Nazi Germany.  Furthermore America may grumble about lack of support in Syria, but it should be thankful for unambiguous British support in the Cold War, our intelligence sharing and the dependability and expertise of our Armed Forces.  The world as a whole can be thankful that apart from the aberration of the second Iraq War, the Special Relationship has been a force for good and a force for freedom and order in world affairs.  It is important it survives.