Monday, 16 August 2021

Liberalism and Militant Islam – different forms of arbitrary power

 

I have often made the assertion that liberalism and militant Islam share certain philosophical premises, making them both different manifestations at opposite extremes of a dark theology.  Such an assertion is greeted with bemused looks, amusement and confusion.  Here is one more attempt to say what I mean.

Liberal reductionism

On the face of it, liberalism and militant Islam could not be more different.  The former represents individualistic freedom, the latter oppression of the individual by a patriarchal theocracy.  Nonetheless, the strange fact about these two ideologies is their common ontological root.  Both operate in an amoral universe, where in effect might is right.  The difference is not so much in their ontology as in where they place authority.

Of course militant Islam usually emerges in more tribal and traditionalist societies.  Nonetheless, as we saw in Timbuctoo or indeed with the Buddhist sculptures in Afghanistan, tradition and history are not safe in the hands of the radical Islamist.  He is a revolutionary and he is such because he has no sense of participation in a telos of  the Good, the True and the Beautiful.  There is not the emphasis in Islam and especially not in militant Islam on Man as being made in the image of God with the potential for participation in the Divine.  This of course has implications not only for iconography, but how we treat humans as the ultimate icons of the Divine.  It deprives us of the foresight to recognise that Man’s telos is to participate in the Divine.  Rather than a dynamic participation in divine love we find in both systems a legalistic framework – at each end of the spectrum, one focusing on rights, the other on restrictions: but legalism as the answer in both cases.

It must at the outset be acknowledged that while liberalism has a brutal and dark side with regard to abortion, euthanasia and suicide, most people in liberal societies are not living under a regime that will exercise power with such brutality as the Taliban or Islamic State.  The purpose here is not to relativise all perspectives, but point to some common roots that explain why liberalism is not enough in itself to resist militant Islam.  Enlightenment values will not do; it is a rediscovery of real Christian values that will protect the West.  Indeed in the liberal respect for the individual there is a hint of Christian sanctity of life, but the idea of the human being has been hideously distorted and reduced by the philosophical twists and turns of Western thought.

Despite a chasm in policy differences with Islam, fundamentally, liberalism, with its roots in English Puritanism, like militant Islam, has an amoral and reductive view of humanity.  Despots are the Hobbesian alternative to the sovereign individual.  Individuals are all potential despots who have no telos of participation in the divine; they are simply permitted to be despots or caliphs, so to speak, in the realm of their own private domain.  The ontology of power and sovereignty is addressed in a different way from Islam, but it still boils down to power and sovereignty.  Liberalism is a political way to manage a world that is just about will and power, with no higher purpose.  Militant Islam makes a religion of will and power.

This tendency in liberalism is in part likely due to the dim view that Puritans took of human nature, with an over-emphasis on original sin.  People had to be managed in a punitive way for a functioning society it was assumed.  The liberal perspective is also due to other broader religious influences, in particular that of the Franciscan theologians of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries in Britain – men such as Dun Scotus and William of Ockham.

 

The Franciscan School and Islamic Influence

The Scottish Dun Scotus is responsible for the theory of univocity of Being, failing as with all Roman Catholic theologians to distinguish between essence and energy.  For Dun Scotus God was not fundamentally different ontologically, but the ultimate form of Being.  This differs from Thomism with its analogy to the unknowable God and also Orthodoxy where God is knowable in His energies, not His essence.  As Anglican theologian John Milbank has pointed out, in this view, men in God’s image were able to become omnipotent rulers in their own domain, like the omnipotent Godhead.  Individuals free to dispose of their property and even their bodies as they wished. 

We cannot rely on Milbank very far, as being a Thomist he too fails to distinguish between energy and essence.  Instead he hides God away entirely as an unreachable and unknowable Being – the mistake that Saint Gregory of Palamas once pointed out would lead the West to atheism.

Combined with the Scottish -Franciscan Duns Scotus’s idea of univocity of Being and haecceity of things (all being particular and individually complete) we have the English-Franciscan William of Ockham.  With his rejection of universals there was nothing at the metaphysical level to participate in.  He denied the reality of generals and universals, reducing them to mere names or constructs.  Thus Man in the image of God was denied his telos to be spiritually transformed.

It is no accident that this stripping Man of his reflecting the Divine glory and denying him the possibility of true theosis is similar to an Islamic view.   Undoubtedly Islam has strong neoplatonic tendencies, with the Monad, the geometrical art and yet the interactoin between West and East led to a loss of understanding of participation.  Thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham were heavily reliant upon the interpretation of Aristotle by Islamic theologian Averroes, who had rejected any neo-Platonic leanings of participation in Forms in Islamic teaching in favour instead of an entirely reductive and nominalist perspective.  Here then European Man in his denuded and materialistic form is very similar to the Islamic Man, who probably was not even made in the image of God and has no telos of theosis, because Allah is far beyond us.

Arbitrary Voluntarism

In effect this means that both Europeans and Moslems are living in an arbitrary world where their purpose is exercise of power – either on behalf of themselves or a despotic God.  The difference is where power lies.  For the Europeans it is found to reside in the individual and laws protect that individual unit.  For Muslims it lies with an arbitrary and unknowable divine power and Shariah law enforces that Divine Will.

There is another factor here common to both Islamic and secular Western thought – voluntarism, from the Latin for will.  It is the sovereign exercise of the will.  Now Islam and liberalism differ in who exercises the will – the individual or Allah, but still will is the source of Right.

The atomistic individual of the West and the Monad of Islam have a key characteristic in common: their non-relational aspect.  The God of Islam is an Ultimate Individual – self-contained, sovereign and arbitrary in his exercise of power.  He is the Monad. The Western individual has complete sovereignty over his acts and is not a part of an organic whole, like many, many monads.  Neither of them can relate to God in a transformative way, participating in the energy of God.  He is unknowable and beyond us.

The Christian Answer of Freedom in Love

Contrast this with Eastern Christian theology.  As theologian Christos Yannaras has pointed out, in a reflection of the Trinity as inter-relational hypostases, human beings are human through relating, through love.  We relate both to God and to our neighbours.  We are not atomistic individuals, but relational personalities.  This is where Orthodox Christianity differs fundamentally from both liberalism and Islam.  Man remains the relational image of God imbued with the possibility through love of transformation.  A latent telos though is not compatible with voluntarist sovereignty, whether that sovereignty simply be over oneself or over others.  To be one’s own master as with the liberal is to deny any higher purpose for which one exists.  Meanwhile, the Muslim is unable to participate in a God because of an ontological chasm between Himself and His creation.  Both the liberal and the Muslim live in a sort of random space, made secure through enforced laws.

Participation in the Good requires there to be more than mere will and power.  Liberalism’s alternative to the despotic God of Islam is to turn each of us into individual despots, within our own boundaries.  This is not a positive alternative to militant and political Islam.  It has already conceded the ontological field of Being to a random exercise of will through power.  Many in the West contrast our culture with Islamic extremism and the surface differences are very apparent.  Nonetheless, we will not be able to resist their powerful and militant aggression without a fundamentally positive assertion that human beings have a meaning and telos beyond subjugation.  Freedom used merely to exercise sovereignty over my own domain is no real freedom of possibilities.  To reassert a positive view of humanity requires rediscovery of a positive theology that regards the human being as a relational personality – a sacred icon of the Divine.  The icon has the potential and the possibility to reflect its Creator through Goodness and Love.  Neither liberalism nor Islam has this positive view of the human being.  Liberalism will not defeat militant Islam, because it is atomised negativity in the face of collective negativity.

Political Implications

The key difference between liberalism and militant Islam is how liberalism diffuses the exercise of power to the atom of society, the individual.  That same power is exercised at a collective level in the militant Islamic society, making it more effective in a clash of wills.  Individualism, with more spontaneity and innovation, produces more wealth and technology, but not the fanatical fighting spirit of the collective will.  Neither option gives human beings true freedom – the freedom to be a whole person through love rather than domination.

The answer for both the West and the East is indeed  the freedom to realise our telos, the participation in the Divine through the God-Man.  This cannot be forced upon people or sold to people like a product.  It has to be lived as the Body of Christ in community.  In terms of politics what does this mean?  It means an openness in political systems to that freedom.  This question asked of those political systems that suppress the possibility of theosis whether by political correctness and secularist institutions or violent oppression in a theocracy does not change the Church, which has often grown through the blood of martyrs or in the catacombs.  It is rather a question asked of Political Islam and Liberalism - whether they have yet participated in supporting such a freedom to be truly human, or instead striven, kicking against the pricks, to hinder and remove this freedom.  In effect this would mean treating every human being as an icon of God. There is the same onus upon liberal and Islamist to honour the real freedom, the freedom that matters.

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