A Guide to the Reform of the House of Lords (originally published on Respublica's Disraeli Room on 16th January 2012)

The composition of the upper house of Parliament has been under question for some time and yet still the question has not been answered.  There have been piecemeal reforms, such as the passing of the two Parliament Acts, the introduction of Life Peers and the removal of the vast majority of hereditary peers, but still the questions are asked.  The Coalition Government has now published a draft House of Lords Reform Bill.

Current Composition

The vast majority of peers are now life peers.  The total number of members of the House of Lords is 788 active members.  This number is divided into 26 Lords Spiritual (Bishops of the Church of England) and the remaining 762 are Lords Temporal.  Of the Lords Temporal there are 92 hereditary peers who have inherited their seats to the Lords and the remainder are life peers, whose seats are removed at their death.

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of life peers under the current Coalition Government.  Since May 2010 there have been 117 peerages created.

There is a mechanism for replacing hereditaries when they pass away.  A by-election is held among the hereditaries (both those sitting and those who have lost their automatic right to sit voting).  The winner replaces his deceased colleague.

History

The House of Lords is the upper house of Parliament and originally was only composed of Lords Spiritual (the bishops) and the Lords Temporal (senior aristocrats).  It emerged in a recognisable form during the Fourteenth Century.  Historically it was more powerful than the Commons, whose members represented the interests of the shires and boroughs.

Under the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell, along with the Monarchy the House of Lords was abolished.  With the Restoration of Monarchy and Lords a more gradual evolution took place, which saw the diminishing of the power of the Lords and the growth in the power of the Commons.

In the early Twentieth Century the Commons cemented its supremacy with the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act.  This legislation was in response to the landed interest represented in the Lords resisting the Liberal Government’s Budget, which included a heavy tax on the landed interest.  Under the threat of the Lords being flooded with new Liberal peers, the Lords gave way and accepted the Parliament Act.

Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949

Money bills to become law automatically if not passed by the Lords within one month.

Other bills can be forced through the Lords if rejected three times (provided two years had passed since the Second reading).

This time was to be shortened to two sessions by the Parliament Act 1949.

Further reforms have also affected the Lords.  Life peers were created by the Life Peerages Act 1958.  The House of Lords Act 1999 took away the right of most hereditaries to sit in the house, with only 92 allowed to remain until an obscure second stage of reform took place.

The Law Lords lost their place in the Lords and the Lord Chancellor his role as speaker of the House as a result of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  As a result the House of Lords is no longer the highest court in the land.  Many of these changes were criticised for having no overall purpose and unpicking the constitutional settlement.

Role of the Lords

The role of the Lords, like that of many British institutions, has evolved rather than been planned.  It has not had its role determined by experts sitting down and working out what it should be; rather it has filled the necessary gaps and provided the function of a revising chamber filled with experts, senior politicians and spiritual and legal leaders.

It sees its purpose as enabling the Commons to think again.  It has no right to override the supremacy of the Commons, but it generally achieves its purpose of considering issues away from the heat of partisan debate with more independence of thought and expertise.  The question therefore left begging is why change it?

Current Proposals

To an extent the argument for reform is that the need has arisen almost by accident.  A system that worked well has been unpicked almost in a fit of absence of mind as New Labour tinkered with the constitution to suit its short-term political needs.

Therefore the scenario presents itself as to what should this second stage of reform be?  The Government itself in its draft bill has left many options open.

It is proposed to have either an 80% elected or a 100% elected Upper Chamber.  Peers would be elected for fifteen year terms and be unable to stand again.  If the 80% option is chosen twelve of the current 26 Lords Spiritual would remain.  With the 100% option they would all be lost.

The case for reform is that Great Britain’s bicameral system is unusual in that it is unelected.  It is also argued that an elected Lords would have more legitimacy and therefore be better able to hold the Commons to account.

The dangers of reform are that the House becomes more partisan, loses its expert and spiritual elements, is made up of politicians who could not make it into the Commons and that it challenges the supremacy of the Commons (the flipside of the argument for an elected chamber).

When embarking upon constitutional reform it is vital that debate is considered and informed.  As the Commons makes up its mind on the 80% or 100% option it must ask the question: What is the purpose of the Lords?  We do not have a written constitution and rather like the Monarchy, the role of the Lords has evolved.  Therefore MPs must look at the current situation to see what the Lords actually does and then ask themselves will current reforms enhance that role or diminish it.  In essence, through evolution, the Lords has become a revising expert chamber, with a strong spiritual and legal input.  Will 80% or 100% elected peers further this equilibrium or hinder it?

- See more at: http://www.respublica.org.uk/item/A-Guide-to-the-Reform-of-the-House-of-Lords

The Point of the Lords Spiritual (originally published on Respublica's Disraeli Room on 29th March 2012)

The bishops in the Lords have in recent years become far more active, the intention being to demonstrate that they do have a vital role in the constitution. Government proposals involve two options, one to retain twelve of the twenty-six bishops and the other to expel them altogether.

Writing for ResPublica’s essay collection on Lords Reform “Our House: Reflections on Representation and Reform in the House of Lords”, the Bishop of Leicester, the Convenor of the Lords Spiritual, has argued that they are representative of the regions, with church parishes across the nation. In a Parliament that is very focused on London, they bring a regional and localist perspective that should be welcomed; surely this is an example of localism embedded into the constitution. The bishops are more representative of the whole of Britain than MPs and peers. The argument made by some, such as Theos, that more specialised, political Lords Spiritual, less focused on the diocese, would diminish that “rootedness” in the regions.

Furthermore the interests that they represent are those of the voluntary sector so vital to civil society. If British society is to be reinvigorated by turning more to the little platoons that make up the Big Society, the leaders of the faith groups, which make up such a strong part of that Big Society, must have a place. So why remove them from the role in the legislature that our history has given them?

Reform Proposals and the Dangers of a Reductive Policy of Equality

The presence of Church of England Bishops is often criticised as discriminating against other faiths and humanists. But the Church of England itself is on record as not opposing in principle other denominations or faith groups having appointees on the Bishops’ Bench. Just as for historic reasons Church of England Bishops sit in the Lords, so for historic reasons representatives of the established Church of Scotland never sat in the Upper House. History has presented us with the House of Lords as it is and has given us the Lords Spiritual who fulfill a useful role.

Furthermore, while there are no rabbis and no imams in the Lords ex officio (it must be remembered that the mechanism of creating a life peerage remains for luminaries of other religious traditions), it would seem to be cutting one’s nose off to spite one’s face to expel bishops simply in adherence to an abstract theory of equality. No one would gain, but all denominations and faiths would be the losers. Other faith groups generally welcome the contribution the bishops make (as can be seen by the contributions of faith leaders to the Joint Committee). It is not straightforward practically to select representatives of other faiths acceptable to all strands of those faiths, but, there are very specific and strong reasons why the Anglican leaders should have a place in the Lords – they represent the established church, they have been there historically and they can bring a spiritual dimension to debate that is welcomed by other faith groups.

But aren’t they out of touch?

In a study for its report “Coming off the Bench”, Theos found that the bishops had been voting and attending debates more often in recent days, but that they rarely voted en bloc and seemed to see their role as one of witness rather than to alter the course of legislation. For example on welfare reform, the bishops have been more willing to speak out and vote. This has been welcomed by some, but strongly criticized by those who feel popular government policies are being delayed.

However, whether one agrees with the bishops on the specifics of a particular issue, their role in the House of Lords cannot be to follow the short-term opinion polls. They are not elected and must therefore be there to come at matters from another angle than the current fashion of opinion. If the role of the Upper House overall is to give the Commons the opportunity to think again, the role of the Lords Spiritual is surely to enable that reflection to take place informed by a spiritual and Christian angle.

Not only Leaders of the Established Church

Our stable and evolved constitution has provided us with an Upper House made up of bishops in addition to peers. Is it right that the bishops should have a say because they lead the national Christian church? As the established Church, the Church of England is there for everyone, not just those who can recite the Nicean Creed. According to the Church of England, three out of ten people in England regard themselves as being Anglican and six out of ten regard themselves as Christian.

But there is much more to their role than this: The bishops do not just speak for the Church of England and are there by right as Lords Spiritual not Church of England delegates. Not only do the Lords Spiritual keep Christianity in the public square, they represent the concerns of other faith groups and even non-faith groups. The Bishops represent a great diversity of groups, in particular civic society and the local regions; they are not simply speaking for the established church. They ensure more than a short-termist, secularist or populist view dominates debate. This is to the benefit of the nation, whether we always agree with what they say or not.

• S

- See more at: http://www.respublica.org.uk/item/The-Point-of-the-Lords-Spiritual

The New Archbishop: A Counter-Cultural First Among Equals (Originally published on Respublica's Disraeli Room on 16 November 2012

With the decision that Justin Welby is to be enthroned as the next Archbishop of Canterbury, it is worth reassessing the value of the role. This is one of the most historic offices of the land, along with that of Monarch and Lord Chancellor. The Archbishop precedes the Lord Chancellor and Prime Minister in order of precedence, but is this merely a historical anomaly? Does the Archbishop as the primus inter pares of the established church still have relevance in twenty-first century Britain?

This article argues that the office of Archbishop could not be more relevant today.  It may help first to set out what the role of the Archbishop is, how he exercises his authority and thereby correct some misapprehensions to assess the utility of this ancient office

The Archbishop has a multi-faceted role.  He is President of the worldwide Anglican Communion, first among the Bishops of the established Church of England as Primate of All England, Metropolitan Bishop of the Province of Canterbury (thirty dioceses) and diocesan Bishop of Canterbury. He sits by right as a Lord Spiritual in the legislature along with York, London, Durham and Winchester; the other twenty-one are there on the basis of seniority.  The current Convenor of the Lords Spiritual is not however the Archbishop, but the Bishop of Leicester.

The authority the Archbishop exercises in these roles is not that of a chief executive – he is not a Prime Minister exercising the Royal Prerogative or a Pope with papal infallibility.  The only two roles in which the Archbishop can exercise executive power are in the See of Canterbury, when he is acting as a diocesan bishop and as Metropolitan Bishop of the Province of Canterbury. In every other aspect of his office his authority rests on intangibles and concepts that are, it must be conceded, somewhat out of fashion.

As the lead bishop of the Anglican Church he is primus inter pares – first among equals.  Rather like the old concept of cabinet government, he exercises his authority through the respect in which his office is held.  The bishops therefore operate in a very different way from the world of business or politics. It is the contention of this article that this is no bad thing, but it does lead to misunderstandings as to why the Archbishop does not seem to set a clear public position for the Church. 

He is not of course the head of the church, that is Christ; but, neither is he the Supreme Governor, for that role falls to the Queen. This is of course a complicated picture, but the reason it works is because it depends upon values and ways of behaviour different from the unambiguous accountability of the world of elected politicians (which when choosing the government of the nation is of course the fundamental principle upon which legitimacy must rest). The Archbishop is not fulfilling the same role as an elected government and his authority does not derive from a bottom-up election so much, as accountability to God.

A close analogy can here be drawn with the role of the Monarchy. The Queen looks for legitimacy to history and a coronation ceremony that emphasised her accountability to God.  If the legitimacy of the Monarchy simply rested on accountability in the same way as elected governments then we would hold elections for the Head of State.  While this is the process elsewhere, there is broad agreement that for reasons of history and emotional attachment, that is not how the British Head of State is chosen. Precisely because the Monarch is not chosen in that way, she is part of the social glue that holds society together.

The Archbishop can only command authority by relying on similar claims of legitimacy.  He cannot claim to have won an election via universal suffrage. No, he relies on what are now counter-cultural concepts of deference, tradition and answerability to the Almighty.  Indeed both Monarch and Archbishop derive legitimacy from the ultimate top-down authority and are very unfashionably not based on the bottom-up approach.  And that is a good thing, because it ensures the persistence of important values that an individualistic analysis does not comprehend.  Duty, faithfulness, selflessness, patriotism are all values not recognised in a world-view that sees life as the individual achieving his own satisfaction.

The political class now looks only to different interpretations of individualism making the Monarch and Archbishop’s roles difficult concepts to grasp. The public, however, as demonstrated by the recent Jubilee celebrations does intuitively get it! Politicians meanwhile seem preoccupied with people having a right to do what they want regardless of the impact on institutions – the arguments for gay marriage are a case in point, where an individual wanting to have something trumps the damage to the institution of marriage, despite marriage being part of that social glue so vital to civil society. The nature and role of the Archbishop means by definition he asserts values contrary to the entitlement agenda of left-wing equalities and rights ideology.

On the right commentary seems to have narrowed conservative thinking to being little more than pro-market ideology. Once Conservatism was about so much more and certainly involved the conserving of those institutions that hold the nation together.  When looking through such a narrow prism of the market being the answer to everything it is no longer possible to articulate arguments in favour of Monarchy, Church and nation.  

The Archbishop therefore has an important role in national life, to act as a custodian and advocate for older and more selfless values. This is not a left or right wing position. It challenges politicians across the spectrum to take into account that there is much more to our nation’s values than the narrow ideological critiques that either look to the market or entitlement to equality at the expense of the social fabric. In the current climate of secularist individualism this is quite simply counter-cultural.

- See more at: http://www.respublica.org.uk/item/The-New-Archbishop-A-counter-cultural-first-among-equals

One Tier or Two (Originally published as part of a Localis pamphlet of the same name)

 Government needs to be closer to residents

All politicians seem to subscribe to the idea of localism. Rather like

“motherhood and apple pie” it is something that by definition is

regarded as good and much lip-service is paid to the concept. Looked

at more closely, however, much of what has been done in the name

of localism, such as attempts to regionalise the United Kingdom, have

actually removed power further away from the individual and rather

increased the tiers of government and bureaucracy.

What then, is the true localist agenda? Our existing system of

local government in this country is in the process of being tinkered

with via the setting up of a number of unitary councils. Much of

the debate about localism on the Right has focussed on the role

of county councils, while the Government has looked to increase

the regional structure on the one hand and devolve power to

parish councils, the smallest forum of local government, on the

other. In this article I intend to concentrate on that more overlooked,

but very much frontline form of local government, the district council.

To be clear, when I am referring to district councils I am talking

about rural district or borough councils within the two-tier local-government

system, as distinguished from unitary borough or district

councils. It is my argument that the two tier system is more democratic,

more accountable and more local.

Coming from a Centre-Right standpoint, I regard localism as a

means of bringing power closer to the individual so that individuals

can have more choice over how they are governed and how public

services are delivered. If Government is more receptive to individual

choices it will by definition be more accountable.

District councils are of a small enough scale to be more responsive

than counties or unitaries and are still able to deliver effectively

because they employ their own bureaucracy. Unfortunately, districts,

like other tiers, have been more and more restricted by central and

European diktat that undermines the concept of local representatives

making local decisions. To address this, the Government should

abandon its plans for more unitary authorities and free local authorities

from central control.

Front-line services

In terms of its localist credentials, the United Kingdom’s system of local

government does not score well. The United Kingdom has one of the

lowest numbers of councillors per 100,000 voters in Europe. Compared

to a country such as France, where one mayor can represent

around 350 voters, the United Kingdom looks less democratic in a

local context.

Where councils are strongest are where their local accountability makes them responsive to local residents needs and wishes in the deliveryof frontline services. A smaller council is less bureaucratic and more democratic, because the councillors are known by their voters and have a smaller officer body to steer. The alternative to more local delivery by delivering services from the centre is likely to be cheaper, but it will be less responsive to the demands of the electors. In the drive for efficiency, centralisation undermines choice. I feel the balance should be on the side of greater choice for residents. If choice is the driver, then local authorities will act more like private companies in their delivery of services. They will be sensitive to the wishes of their consumers.

As any neo-classical economist knows, central planning is less

responsive to local and individual demands and undermines diversity

A smaller council is less bureaucratic and more democratic, because the councillors are known by their voters and have a smaller officer body to steer and competition of different models. A useful real-life example of district councils being innovative and responsive in their delivery of their

services is Tandridge District Council’s waste contract.

Tandridge has negotiated a contract that fulfils the residents’ preference

for a back-door waste collection. It may be that this front-line

service is more expensive, but it is what the users of the service prefer

to pay for. Were the waste collection service delivered county wide

or across a section of the county on a unitary basis, it would be far

more difficult to respond to the preferences of Tandridge residents.

In a predominantly rural district, with an aging population, a backdoor

service works and is preferred by council-tax payers. A service

deliverer that covered a wider area would have to reach for the lowest

common denominator, where different needs had to be addressed,

for example urban versus rural.

Another general argument for services being delivered by smaller

bodies is that it enables alternative methods to be tested. The larger

the organisations, the fewer are the opportunities for experiment. Innovation

is more likely and better methods are more likely to be tried out

if there are more service deliverers.

Another key area of innovation that enables district councils to learn

from one another and adopt best practice is joint-working. This brings

the advantage of economies of scale without the loss of local autonomy

or responsiveness to voters’ preferences.

Are unitary authorities the solution?

To remain true to the spirit of localism it must be right to accept that

unitaries are the right answer in some cases but not others. It all

depends on the local circumstances on the ground. For example, a

city such as Plymouth is naturally a unit with a clear identity, but a

County such as Cornwall is diverse and the unpopularity of the

moves towards a unitary authority demonstrates that a keen sense

of local identity works against single tier authorities that cover a

large area.

The argument for unitaries usually put forward is that service delivery

works better if there is one organisation delivering. It is not

resident-friendly and can be very confusing if one authority is responsible

for one service and another for other services. Waste is a clear

example of this, where districts are responsible for waste collection

and counties for waste disposal.

That may well be the case, but it does not undermine the central

point that the more local the level of service delivery the more responsive

it is. Rather than a definite argument for unitaries, this point could

be employed to argue that more frontline services, such as road maintenance

could be devolved to districts.

Where unitaries undermine localism they are a step in the wrong

direction. For example, prima facie it must be the case that reducing

the number of local councillors reduces democracy and accountability.

This is usually the result when districts and counties are replaced

by unitaries.

Another argument in favour of local-government reorganisation

often put forward is the savings that will be made. The jury really still

is out on this though. As I understand it, too often the creation of

unitary councils has been far more expensive than originally expected.

Local government reorganisation can prove a costly exercise.

As mentioned above, many of the advantages of amalgamating

tiers of local government can be achieved by joint working with other

councils. This can achieve all the advantages of working together,

achieving best practice and making substantial savings without the

cost, both financial and democratic of moving towards one tier.

What’s wrong with the present system?

In short the answer to this is not enough localism and too much topdown

decision making. Much ink has been spent on why powers

should be devolved back to county councils and the arguments are

well rehearsed, but it is also the case that district councils operate

within a straitjacket set up by central government. A culture of topwww.

down targets, ring-fenced grants and negative subsidising has led to

a situation where local councillors are often in a position of simply

implementing central government policy. This undermines local

accountability and means that the local councillor is often viewed as

ineffective.

To take one key example, when voters elect their local councillor onto the local planning authority, they expect that they will be represented.  Instead they find that local councillors must give more weight to  government policy statements than their own local planning policies and if they do defy the thrust of central government policy to meet their

own local needs, they may well find themselves overridden by the planning inspectorate.

The disadvantage of local decisions being overridden in planning

matters is that it allows the local councillors to take decisions while

avoiding consequences. For example it can mean a populist stance

is taken and then the blame laid on the inspector when he overturns

the decision; alternatively, councillors can rely too much on what an

inspector is likely to do when making their decision and thereby overlook

local needs. It is important to emphasise that local councillors

usually work very well within these constraints, but when decisions are

overturned residents understandably ask, “what is the point in a local

planning authority if the centre has the final say?”

If local councillors were given greater responsibility for their decisions

it would actually work against the so-called “NIMBY”

temptation. Councillors would not simply be able to play to the

gallery when they knew for example that an unpopular affordable

housing estate needed to be built. Greater power would mean real

responsibility being taken and would make local councillors more

accountable. Voters would feel that there was far more point to voting

in local elections if the representatives they elected had real power to

make decisions.

A similar example of the present problem of over-centralisation is in

the realm of housing policy. The local housing authority has very

limited autonomy. Most of what it is responsible for is in effect dictated

by central government guidelines. For example, rent increases in

council accommodation rent-increases are now required by government

guidance to converge with the rents of housing associations. A

recent decision to lower the level of increase because of the economic

climate was initiated by central government.

The issue of rent increase was once a matter of genuine debate in

town halls up and down the land. It was an emotive issue on which

local representatives could vote according to their political principles.

Now the level of debate is very limited because, in reality, there is

very little local autonomy.

Although central government only issues guidance, it rewards those

housing authorities that follow the guidance on rents and penalises

those who do not follow the guidelines via the subsidy mechanism.

Central government relies on the subsidy mechanism in a number of

ways to control local housing policy.

The most inimical aspect to localism of the subsidy system is negative

subsidy. This is where local housing authorities that manage their

housing stock well and thereby, according to government calculations

should be in surplus, are required to pay money from their housing

revenue accounts to central government.

A genuinely local policy on transferring or retaining stock is also

very difficult to maintain. Local authorities are required to ballot

tenants on stock transfer. If councils cannot afford to meet the government

requirement of decent homes standard, they are put in a

position where they have little choice but to transfer the stock.

It might be asked why it is a bad thing that local housing authorities

are cajoled into increasing the living standards of their tenants. Of

course no reasonable man or woman would oppose improvements in

living standards on the grounds of a political theory. If local accountability

is taken away however, then it becomes far more difficult for the

local councillor to champion the cause of tenants in his or her ward or

for the tenants to truly hold their social landlord to account. For

example, if the decent homes standard requires one piece of work to

be carried out and the demand from tenants is for another more pressing

piece of work, the local need must fall subject to the central,

uniform perspective. Centrally-imposed solutions mean less opportunity

for local solutions truly applicable to the specific needs of the

specific tenants.

Solutions

The goal of localism must surely be what European treaties refer to as

subsidiarity i.e. allowing decisions to be made at the lowest possible

level. For local authorities to have real autonomy top-down targets

must be drastically curtailed and local authority funding must be

looked at again. Power should be devolved not to new quangos at a

regional level or parish councils with no bureaucracy to implement

local wishes, but to the district level as seen in the two tier system.

There can be no real freedom for local authorities, without reform

of local government funding. The more local councils are responsible

for their own funding, the more they can be held to account, rather

than simply competing to spend more and larger government grants.

For this reason the national non-domestic rates, or business rates,

should be retained at least in part by local authorities. This would

also encourage local authorities to promote economic growth, as their

revenue would increase with the number of businesses.

The argument of this article is that district councils are in the frontline

of democracy and therefore most responsive to local pressures.

Given the greater number of district councillors and the smaller wards

it is easier for voters to recognise and interact with them. The district

councillor is usually in the heart of a small community and is usually

known.

When the district councillor is at work he or she is dealing with a

much smaller officer body and therefore councillor influence over the

direction of council policy can penetrate any officer cadre that might

exist. Larger bodies are far more difficult to penetrate as the elected

member is faced by a large bureaucracy. Ironically this can mean that

councillors on larger councils do not have a strategic overview and find

themselves only able to concentrate on small-scale ward level problems.

The democratic steer of the overall direction is therefore weak.

Districts are of a size with a small enough officer staff for members

to have a truly strategic influence that is responsive to the direction

that their voters feel the community should be heading. Therefore

voters have more of a say about how they are governed.

In terms of participation in democracy, districts because of their

size, if freed from central control, are the right level to increase

engagement. Furthermore, by dint of the fact that there are more councillors

there are inevitably more activists engaged in the political

process, such as delivering literature, canvassing, knocking up on

polling day. 

All these ways of being involved increase engagement

with the voter. The fact that districts provide more volunteers directly

engaged is in itself a way of involving more people in politics.

On this basis, the possibility of devolving more services to the district

council should be looked at. At one time district councils were responsible

for highways, why not return this responsibility? If education were to be the responsibility of district councils rather than the county, councillors accountable to a smaller

number of voters could have a much greater voice over issues affecting the schools in their ward. It would probably be necessary for the building to remain in the ownership of the

county councils, but the delivery of education could become the responsibility

of the less remote, more local district council.

These are but a few suggestions. The main point is that if we truly

believe in localism, those local authorities that have more localist credentials

should be given more responsibilities. Rather than creating

new tiers of government at a higher level and giving them an overall

say on local issues, true devolution is about freeing the existing local

councils that for too long have often only been able to act as rubber

stamps for central government policy.

Please find the full pamphlet at:  http://www.localis.org.uk/images/articles/Localis-One%20Tier%20or%20Two_.pdf