Once we quantify the human being by reducing him to flesh and blood alone and chemical reactions in the brain it is no longer easy to differentiate the human being from the A.I. facsimile or the robot. Those who speak in favour of abortion often refer to the unborn baby as nothing more than a cluster of cells. This fits with their materialist ontology, but it is unclear why the born baby, the child or the adult is any more than a cluster of cells. From the materialist perspective we are all as soulless as the foetus. And if we are soulless then how are we different from the robot? A similar question arises for the non-physical virtual personality that can be created by artificial intelligence. It is not about being physical or not. It is rather about what it is that makes the human-being fundamentally different from technological manufactured automata that mimic us with such accuracy and potentially even seem to act spontaneously.
There is a bizarre concept that emerged from the tech world of singularity that is known as “speciesism”. This idea draws an analogy with racism and applies a similar opprobrium. In this case though, to favour the human “species” as a whole is seen as a prejudiced and discriminatory approach. To most sane people it is clear this has reduced concepts to the absurd. While we perceive this though, the parameters of debate and the ontological and spiritual assumptions of our society mean we can no longer articulate reasons for the uniqueness of Man. Man is no longer the imago Dei, but a consequence of impersonal evolutionary and biological forces. We are thus silenced by the materialist limits of thought in the modern world.
We urgently need an understanding that affords an explanation of why human beings are fundamentally different from simulacra, automata and facsimiles. Instead of adopting the reductive rationale of materialism, which deprives us of satisfactory accounts of what it is to be human, we need an understanding that affords an adequate account.
Such an exercise is only necessary if we still believe humans are more than mere mechanisms driven by a biological momentum for survival. If we are instead ready to adopt a mechanistic and materialist view of the human being, then we must be prepared to acknowledge then the inevitable reduction of no value, no quality and a loss of any sense of why our own kind are in a special sense unique and sacred. One might be ready to accept such a bleak world, but it means denying the value of human love, human art, human history, human faith and the intrinsic value of human life. This, it is suggested, is not a belief system, but pathology.
In some sense Kant’s transcendental argument seems to help here. The God postulate is necessary to explain what cannot be explained. So much of human value, the conscience, morality, telos, requires that we postulate God as existing. This though seems an over-rationalised and deracinated argument for higher meaning. Instead, more convincing on a human level, rather than at a theoretical level, is our experiential existence that tells us what is real, prior to the sort of abstraction that both science and philosophy impose upon our immediate experience.
Our most real experience is as a person and it is of other human people. All the interactions, from the babe in arms responding to his mother’s expression and touch, to our meeting of strangers - all is personal. This is the primary and real experience. And this is what helps us perceive the artificiality of the artificially-created reality. Furthermore, after people we also encounter Creation itself as real, with a clear imprint of the divine Person. Afterwards, abstract ideas are imposed that try to suggest viewing through the microscope or the telescope (perspectives that while real involve abstraction by abolishing either distance or scale) is more real that what we encounter in our lived reality as personal beings encountering one another and a personally-created cosmos.
We should not then discard the very attitude that helps us distinguish the real from the virtual. And as stated above there is a reductive move that can legitimately be seen as pathological by abstracting to such an extent that we lose that perception. So instead we need an explanation that affords validity to that perception and it is not to be found in abstracted philosophy or science. It is primarily the personal encounter, which involves freedom and faith. Freedom, because the personal interaction is not controlled and faith because we trust a higher purpose to the uncontrolled encounters.
We must then turn to an account of the world that is deeply personal. The abstracted and scientific mind tends to see this as biased and lacking the necessary objectivity. This scientific attitude though is exactly the problem. It tries to turn us into neutral observers who have no existential commitment to the phenomena we encounter. We are taught instead to detach ourselves and observe the world in artificial laboratory conditions. It is such an approach that means we can no longer distinguish the value of the real over the virtual.
What affords a full understanding then is that through our experiential encounter with phenomena we encounter others as persons and a world crafted by a Person. The human being is recognised as the imago Dei and the reality of the world is understood as a personal Creation of the ultimate Person. This affords an understanding of why the real and the actual person is fundamentally valuable in a way that the virtual is not. There can be no artificially created human, the artificial world of virtual reality is not real. We understand rather that it is a creation by a partial and finite person, unlike reality itself as the creation of the infinite Person. Artificial worlds and creations have value of course aesthetically, but we understand that they are not real. And they are valued inasmuch as they enable us to participate in something through their material parts that is of value beyond those material substances. The great painting is not merely paint on canvas, it creates a picture of a world that we encounter because we recognise the person of the artist speaking to us about something of value. We do not though mistake it for complete reality.
Thinking specifically now of the human person, his qualitative value is that he is also both in his physical existence and is his body, but also something beyond this. He is also spirit and he is made by and oriented towards his personal Creator. He is not mere matter alone and neither is he a mere mechanism. His existence is orientated towards the highest value and even if that orientation is awry, still like the divine Creator he is a person whom we encounter and relate to as a person and not a facsimile. But only if we reject the mechanistic understanding of the material as the total reality, can we personally encounter the personal reality.
The tech fanatics then are rather like Chesterton’s lunatic in the asylum. They exist in a compact and complete world that is internally completely rational and yet he is detached from reality outside of his mind. He rejects the validity of the encounter with the person, reducing it to a merely materialist understanding. It is for this reason he can talk seriously about “speciesism” or assert that he can be downloaded onto a computer. We have seen though instead that the traditional understanding of God, man as imago Dei and reality as created affords an understanding that means we can recognise and distinguish the real from the virtual.
We must remember this truth as we confront the growing potency and ubiquity of the virtual and artificial. It seems as though the only way to survive the confusion that will compromise the value of all that is valuable is the religious outlook.